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GUCCI LOST HALF ITS BUSINESS — AND IT WASN'T BAD LUCK

NOV 9, 2026 · SPLASH · SOURCED FROM BUILD INC. · THE BUSINESS
Gucci storefront

THE PEAK. In 2019 Gucci was the most desired fashion brand on earth. Revenue had nearly tripled in four years. Operating profit had almost quadrupled, to just under €10 billion. The double-G logo was stitched onto the dreams of an entire generation, and one brand was carrying a global luxury empire on its back.

By 2025 that same brand had fallen to just under €6 billion — a 22 percent drop in a single year, and roughly half of what it was. Kering's recurring operating income fell by about a third. Three creative directors in as many years. A stock wipeout.

The answer isn't bad luck. It's a brand that stopped listening.

THE HOUSE THAT ALMOST DIED TWICE. Guccio Gucci founded it in Florence in 1921 after years as a luggage porter in a London hotel, hauling the leather cases of rich travelers through marble lobbies and deciding he could make them himself. What followed was a century of the same story on loop: quiet, serious craft; the green-and-red stripe borrowed from a saddle girth; Hollywood glamour; family feuds, lawsuits, and a murder plotted by one Gucci against another.

By the 1990s it had drifted into irrelevance. Then Tom Ford made it sexy and provocative and dragged it back to the center of the culture almost overnight.

That rescue matters more than it looks. It proved that Gucci's fortunes live or die on one question — whether the person holding the creative pen understands the moment and the customer. The brand was about to prove it twice, once in triumph and once in catastrophe.

THE MOMENT. In 2015, with the brand needing a designer fast, management gambled on an insider almost nobody could pick out of a lineup: Alessandro Michele. He tore up the sleek minimalism and replaced it with maximalism — floral suits, oversized vintage glasses, clashing prints, bees and tigers and snakes embroidered on everything from sneakers to silk shirts. A grandmother's attic reinterpreted by a brilliant art student.

It landed at exactly the right second. Instagram was detonating. A new generation came into money and spent it online, and they had no interest in their parents' quiet luxury. They wanted something that popped on a phone screen. Michele's Gucci was engineered, almost by accident, for that world. Rappers wore it in videos, influencers draped themselves in it for the grid, and the logo belt with the interlocking G's became the most recognizable status symbol on the planet.

Revenue nearly tripled. At its peak, Gucci alone generated close to half of Kering's sales and the lion's share of its operating profit.

THE FIRST CRACK. To keep hitting those numbers, Gucci had to sell more — and the way it did that was logos and the aspirational middle-class shopper. Not old money commissioning bespoke pieces. Ordinary people stretching a budget for a belt, a wallet, an entry-level bag, just to own a piece of the hottest brand alive.

"The entire value of a $1,000 belt comes from the shared feeling that not everyone can have it."

Scarcity is the product. The moment a status symbol is on every third person on a Saturday, it stops being a status symbol and becomes a belt. By the end of the decade the logo was everywhere, heavily counterfeited, and the wealthiest customers — the ones who carry a house through a downturn — began drifting away. Too common for the rich, too expensive for everyone else.

THE GROUND SHIFT. Then 2020. Stores shut, travel evaporated, and the Chinese shoppers who had become luxury's biggest engine were locked down. When the world reopened, taste had moved: the loud, logo-covered maximalism of the previous decade suddenly read as dated. The industry had a new word — quiet luxury — which was the precise opposite of everything Gucci had built.

Compounding it: Gucci was more dependent on China than almost anyone, and Chinese demand cooled sharply. Analysts were blunt — too exposed to China, too reliant on middle-income customers, already in decline.

THE PANIC. Late 2022: Michele left after seven years, reportedly over tension with Kering management and a refusal to dilute his vision. Replacing a legend is hard. What Gucci did next turned it into a disaster.

They hired Sabato De Sarno, a respected craftsman from Valentino, to deliver exactly what the trend reports ordered: refined, grown-up, minimal, with a new signature color. Polished, tasteful, and almost completely forgettable. One analyst put it as plainly as it can be put — De Sarno's demure style didn't fit the exuberant image consumers had of Gucci from the previous thirty years.

The brand had spent a decade teaching the world that Gucci meant bold. Then it handed those same customers the opposite and seemed surprised when they shrugged and walked past.

THE NUMBERS. In the first nine months of 2024, Gucci revenue dropped about 20 percent. Kering's stock lost roughly a third of its value in a twelve-month stretch. In February 2025 Gucci fired De Sarno after less than two years — days before annual results, two weeks before his collection was supposed to walk Milan. The show went ahead with no creative director at all, the clothes finished quietly by the in-house studio.

THE GAMBLE. March 2025: Demna, the Georgian designer who spent a decade turning Balenciaga into a provocation machine — $1,000 pre-destroyed sneakers, trash-bag handbags — was named artistic director. Kering stock lost nearly $3 billion in value within hours. Investors weren't wrong to flinch; they were just reading the same board everyone else was. Nobody had been talking about Gucci for two years, and Demna guarantees people talk.

THE SQUEEZE. The structural problem remains unsolved. Gucci has two customers who want opposite things. The genuinely wealthy want rarity — and left because the logo was everywhere. The aspirational shopper wants the loud, joyful thing — and left because savings ran out and prices kept climbing. Go quiet and you lose the second. Stay loud and you lose the first.

And underneath it: in the years Gucci should have been earning loyalty with new ideas, it raised prices on familiar products instead. For a while the heat covered it. The moment the heat faded, those prices stopped reading as prestige and started reading as being taken for granted.

SPLASH'S READ: This is the cleanest case study in luxury of mistaking a spike for a brand.

Gucci didn't lose its craftsmanship. It lost the thing that made craftsmanship matter — the sense that owning it meant something specific. During the boom it sold that feeling by the million until there was nothing scarce left to sell, and then, when the bill came due, it did the one thing a house with a decade of receipts should never do: it listened to a trend deck instead of its own customers.

Quiet luxury was never Gucci's game. Somebody at a conference said the word, the analysts nodded, and a brand with thirty years of loud, joyful identity walked into a beige room and forgot who it was.

The cruelest detail is the sequencing. They fired the maximalist, hired a minimalist, fired him in under two years, then hired the most maximalist designer in Europe — a full circle completed in public, at a cost of roughly half the business.

Gucci will probably come back. Houses like this usually do, eventually, on the strength of the archive and a good runway. But the lesson doesn't depend on the comeback: your customers will tell you who you are, if you're humble enough to listen. Gucci spent a decade being told, loudly and profitably, and then decided it knew better.

Sources & claims: Build Inc. (YouTube), "When Ignoring Your Customers Backfires: Gucci's Broken Business." Revenue and profit figures (peak ~€10B, 2025 just under €6B, ~22% decline, Kering operating income down ~1/3, ~$3B market-value drop on the Demna announcement) are as presented in the video and consistent with Kering's reported results. Designer timelines (Michele's departure late 2022, De Sarno hired and fired Feb 2025, Demna named March 2025) are public record.