THE OPERATING RATIO. Cut the crews, run longer trains, buy back the stock. By 2022 the regulator was issuing emergency orders and Congress was blocking a strike.
THE MODEL HAS A NAME. Precision Scheduled Railroading — PSR — is the operating philosophy that took over American freight rail. Instead of running trains when customers need them, you run a fixed schedule of fewer, longer trains, cut the workforce, close the hump yards, and measure yourself on one number: the operating ratio, or expenses as a percentage of revenue.
Lower is better. And by that metric, the last decade has been a triumph — the Class I railroads pushed operating ratios into the 50s, numbers that would have been unthinkable in 2005.
The problem is what the metric doesn't measure: whether the freight moves.
THE CUTS. Six of the seven largest US freight railroads have implemented PSR, according to the GAO. The workforce came with it: Class I employment is down roughly 30% since PSR took hold, and the Surface Transportation Board's chair noted headcount at the four US Class I carriers was around 107,000 — a 25% drop from the years before the pandemic.
In practice that means fewer crews, fewer maintenance workers, fewer yard jobs — and fewer people to recover when something goes wrong. A railroad run at minimum staffing has no slack. Slack is the thing you need precisely on the days the system breaks.
WHERE THE MONEY WENT. This is the heart of the critique. The savings didn't go into capacity — new track, more terminals, more crews. They went to shareholders: buybacks and dividends, at a scale that made the railroads some of the best-performing industrial stocks in the market.
In April 2023, US rail labor unions formally called on the carriers to halt all stock buybacks until safety improved and the lean operating model was abandoned.
That's not an argument that buybacks are illegal or unusual. It's an argument about what a railroad is: a piece of national infrastructure with captive customers, not a software company with a share price to manage.
2022: THE YEAR IT BROKE IN PUBLIC. Service deteriorated badly enough that the Surface Transportation Board — the federal regulator — issued service emergency orders in July 2022, citing an "alarming and unmitigated decline in service."
The customers affected weren't abstract: chemical manufacturers, grain shippers, automakers, utilities that depend on rail because there is no truck alternative at their volume. When a railroad runs late, a chemical plant shuts down, grain sits in a silo, and a utility runs out of coal.
The Department of Transportation had already published a report in February 2022 critical of PSR, freight rates and consolidation. The regulators were warning before the collapse — the warnings just didn't have a share price attached.
THE STRIKE THAT CONGRESS STOPPED. By late 2022, rail labor and the carriers were deadlocked over a contract. A nationwide strike would have frozen a huge share of American freight, and on December 2, 2022, President Biden signed legislation imposing the agreement and blocking the strike.
One detail matters enormously: an amendment to add seven days of paid sick leave failed — opposed by Republicans and Senator Joe Manchin. So the deal that averted the strike did not include paid sick days for the workers whose staffing levels had been cut to the bone.
That is the whole story in a single vote: the system's fragility was resolved by requiring the workers to absorb it.
THE SAFETY BILL CAME DUE. In February 2023, a Norfolk Southern train derailed in East Palestine, Ohio, and a controlled burn of vinyl chloride sent a plume over the town. The derailment became the national symbol of what lean railroading can cost — and Norfolk Southern later agreed to a $600 million class-action settlement with residents and a $310 million settlement with the EPA.
The causation debate is real and contested. But the structural point isn't: longer trains, fewer inspections per mile and thinner staffing reduce the margin for error on a system that hauls hazardous material through populated towns.
WHY THIS INDUSTRY IS DIFFERENT. Three conditions make rail uniquely vulnerable to this kind of value extraction:
1. Captivity. A grain elevator or chemical plant often has one railroad serving it. There's no competing bid to switch to. The customer can't walk away — which means service quality doesn't discipline the operator the way it would in a competitive market.
2. Consolidation. Decades of mergers left a handful of Class I carriers controlling the national network. The STB is the only referee, and it moves at regulatory speed.
3. A metric that rewards deterioration slowly. The operating ratio improves immediately when you cut staff. The service damage shows up next quarter, in someone else's supply chain. By the time it's visible, the savings are booked and the bonuses are paid.
AND IT'S STILL HAPPENING. As recently as February 2026, the American Chemistry Council and the National Grain and Feed Association joined rail labor unions in condemning service cuts — an unusual coalition of shippers and workers on the same side against the carriers.
When your customers and your employees are making the same complaint in public, that's not a labor dispute. That's a business model with an externalized cost.
SPLASH'S READ: Precision Scheduled Railroading is a finance metric cosplaying as an operations strategy. It works beautifully on a spreadsheet and badly on a railroad, because a railroad's job is to have capacity available on the day nobody expected to need it.
The savings were real. The buybacks were real. So were the emergency orders, the strike threat, the congressional intervention and the derailment in Ohio.
You can run a railroad like a spreadsheet. You just can't run a spreadsheet through a town.