ABOUT $882 MILLION IN CASINO FEES PASSED THROUGH TUNICA COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI between December 1992 and September 2019 — a county that at its poorest had 56.8% of residents below the poverty line and fewer than 10,000 people. The money came. Roughly one in three residents is still poor.
The state audit that explains the gap is PEER report 633, released in October 2019. It runs about 80 pages. Almost nobody read it. This page is about what it found.
SUGAR DITCH
Before the casinos there was a ditch.
It ran along a row of shanties on the black side of Tunica, an open channel no wider than a man could step over, where families with no plumbing emptied their buckets each morning and rinsed them and set them out to dry. They called it Sugar Ditch. The name was the only sweet thing about it.
This was 1985. That year a 60 Minutes crew walked those unpaved yards and showed the country the poorest county in America. Census figures put the poverty rate above 52% in 1980, climbing to 56.8% by 1990 — more than four times the national average.
Jesse Jackson came down, stood in the mud and called it “America's Ethiopia.” The phrase ran everywhere.
And here is the detail that predicts everything after it: by 1986 the shanties were demolished and sewer lines went in — but hundreds of thousands in federal grant dollars had gone to improving the town square, one street over, while the people on Sugar Ditch still had no sewage. The money went where it was visible first.
THE LEGAL FICTION THAT BUILT IT
In 1990 the Mississippi legislature legalized dockside casino gambling. The word mattered: under state law the gaming had to happen on vessels in navigable water. In practice that meant casinos built on barges in oxbow lakes and tributaries.
They looked like casinos. They were casinos. But legally they were boats — and that fiction decided where they could be built, what land they sat on, and what happened to them when the river rose.
Tunica County approved gaming without opposition. It had nothing left to lose.
THE FIRST ONE WAS A DISCO ON A BARGE
19 October 1992, at a spot called Moon Landing: a casino called Splash, opened by two novices named Rick and Ron Schilling in a refurbished disco on a barge. No hotel. No restaurants. No parking garage. A door charge of $10.
It made money so fast that the brand-new Mississippi Gaming Commission — understaffed and unprepared — shut it down for two days because the accountants could not count the cash fast enough.
People stood in line three hours in Delta heat to get into a former disco on a barge in a cotton field.
Within a year three more opened at Moon Landing. By 1994 the county was being called oversaturated with 10 casinos. Splash itself closed by 1995 — three years from revolutionary to irrelevant.
AND THEN JACK BINION
Benny Binion's son, the man who had run the Horseshoe in downtown Las Vegas and watched the action move to the Strip, drove down and saw Fremont Street before the Strip was built.
He bought land at Robinsonville — a crossroads ten miles north of Tunica town and twenty minutes from Memphis — directly off Highway 61. Every gambler driving south out of Tennessee would hit his property first.
February 1995: the Horseshoe opens, with a sister property later renamed Goldstrike. He put the poker tables at the front, not the back. He started the Jack Binion World Poker Open, for years the second-largest poker tournament in America, on ESPN. Doyle Brunson played there.
1996: Grand Casino Tunica opens at the northern edge of the county — the closest possible casino to Memphis. Three hotel towers, 1,300 rooms, a 136,000-square-foot gaming floor (the largest between Las Vegas and Atlantic City), a golf course, a convention centre, an arcade, an RV park, on more than 2,000 acres of former cotton land.
Next door the Goldstrike added a 31-storey tower of gold-tinted glass — the tallest building in Mississippi. You could see it from the cotton fields.
By the end of 1996: 10 casinos along a stretch of road renamed Casino Strip Boulevard. In 2005 Robinsonville was officially renamed Tunica Resorts because visitors couldn't find the casinos otherwise. The casino market had become the county.
THE NUMBER THAT SHOULD HAVE WARNED THEM
At its peak the industry employed about 14,000 people — more casino jobs than there were people in the county.
So where did everybody live? Somewhere else. The housing stock was poor, the schools weren't competitive with DeSoto County, there were no chain restaurants or amenities a middle-class family expects. Workers commuted in from Memphis, DeSoto, northern Mississippi, western Tennessee, eastern Arkansas — and took their paychecks, their spending and their property taxes home with them.
Tunica got the jobs. DeSoto got the residents.
Meanwhile the county built: more than 30 miles of new four-lane road, a $38 million airport with a 7,000-foot runway (70,000 passengers a year by 2008), new water and sewer, a bigger library, an arena and exposition centre, a golf and tennis centre, an aquatic centre. More than $46 million in gaming fees went into the schools.
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis published a study and called it the Tunica Miracle — the phrase boosters used for years, and the case study a hundred other desperate counties cited when they pitched their own legislatures. If it can happen there, it can happen anywhere.
Peak: fiscal year 2006 — about $46.6 million in local gaming fees. Ten casinos, 14,000 slot machines, 400 table games, 6,000 hotel rooms, 40 restaurants, 15,000 employees. Third-largest gaming destination in America, behind only Las Vegas and Atlantic City.
Total gaming revenue for the market is quoted in different sources as $1.16 billion, $1.66 billion, even $3 billion — published estimates disagree so wildly that no single number can honestly be stated as fact. What is certain is that hundreds of millions a year moved through a county whose economy had been cotton and food stamps.
THE DECISION THAT LOOKED GENEROUS
1997. Flush with casino money, the Board of Supervisors cut property taxes by 25%. The town of Tunica went further and eliminated municipal property taxes entirely — a zero rate.
Why tax residents when millions of gamblers from Memphis were paying for everything? A Memphis Flyer piece at the time put it plainly: $2 million a year from the casinos was more than locals ever dared dream of.
It looks like the smartest thing a poor county ever did. It is the foundation of everything that goes wrong next.
WHAT THE AUDIT FOUND
The trigger was allegations of mismanagement. The Mississippi Legislature's PEER committee — Joint Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review — released report 633 in October 2019, covering fiscal 2013 through August 2019.
The money in: approximately $882 million in total gaming fees, December 1992 to September 2019. Of that the county retained about $722 million; $97 million went to the school district; $63 million to the town of Tunica; about $11 million to the levee board.
$722 million retained by a government serving fewer than 10,000 people. During the review period gaming fees were 62% of all county revenue — a county with a single income source and a government that had voluntarily destroyed its backup.
The money out:
• $4.3 million more spent than taken in, fiscal 2013 to August 2019.
• By August 2019 the general fund had a negative balance of $4.9 million.
• $22.9 million into county-owned facilities: arena $6.7M, health clinics $6.5M, golf and tennis centre $4.1M, river park $3.6M, airport $2M.
• Another $5.5 million to outside organisations.
• $3.4 million through a “grants” account the auditors found was being used to misclassify expenses, routing reimbursements and payments in lieu of tax through a line item that made public tracking nearly impossible.
A golf and tennis centre in a county where a third of residents were poor is a line item that explains itself.
THE ROAD FUND, THE AG, AND THE TIMING
April 2018, with the general fund nearly $5 million in the hole: the board transferred $5 million out of the county road fund into the general fund.
Under Mississippi law, road money can only be used for roads and bridges. This is not a grey area. The Attorney General confirmed it in writing in December 2018, and PEER confirmed it again: the transfer was contrary to state law.
The board did nothing. No reversal, no repayment plan, not even an agenda item. For seven months $5 million of road money sat illegally in the general fund.
It moved back in June 2019 — when PEER auditors physically arrived and started asking for files. The report notes the timing carefully.
And the tax cut came due. With gaming revenue falling, the county needed property tax again. In fiscal 2015 it began assessing a 9-mil countywide levy for road maintenance. Based on actual road spending, the county needed about 3 mils — roughly a third. The overassessment cost residents about $5.5 million over three fiscal years, 2015 to 2017.
Asked for a rationale, officials said they wanted to rebuild the road fund balance. No analysis, no projected need.
Follow the circle: cut property tax in the boom, eliminate it entirely, spend freely on amenities, overtax the poorest residents when revenue fell, put that money in the road fund, illegally move $5 million out of the road fund to cover the deficit, and move it back only when the auditors walked in.
THE COUNTY THAT SUED ITS OWN SCHOOLS
In 2014 the board asked the legislature to reduce the share of gaming fees going to the town and the school district. The legislature refused.
So the county sued, arguing the local law was unconstitutional. For 14 months — November 2014 to December 2015 — neither the town nor the school district received its required payments.
The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled against the county. All withheld funds were repaid: about $3.9 million to the schools, $2.2 million to the town, plus a $350,000 settlement for legal fees and interest.
A county government that had received three-quarters of a billion dollars in gaming fees took its own school district and its own town to court to avoid sharing.
And remember what was actually earmarked for residents: 14% of gaming fees went to education. The rest — the special gaming fund, roads, the general fund — was available for whatever the board decided. What reached anything resembling a direct programme for the poorest residents was, by any honest accounting, a sliver.
The housing programme tells the same story smaller: about $1.6 million in rehabilitation spending without documentation showing the work was done, 41% of total programme spending on administration, and contracts with the regional housing authority unsigned from February 2015 to September 2018.
THE BUST
Competition arrived from every direction: Oklahoma tribal casinos, Missouri riverboats, Louisiana. Then the deepest cut came from across the river — Arkansas legalised casino gambling, and Southland Park in West Memphis converted from a dog track into a full casino ten minutes from downtown Memphis.
The pipeline that had fed Tunica for a decade had a detour. Tunica's gaming revenue fell at about 6.4% a year from 2010. In the first quarter of 2011, 726,000 Tennesseans visited; the number fell every year after. By 2013 the visitors bureau head was saying the quiet part: “Our problem today is not a gaming problem, it's a tourism problem.”
Then the 2008 recession took the day-trippers with a few hundred dollars and an optimistic spirit. Then the river came.
May 2011, one of the worst Mississippi floods on record. The gaming floors floated on barges and largely survived — the legal fiction everyone mocked saved the most expensive piece of each property. But the hotels, lobbies, convention halls and parking garages were on dry land that was no longer dry.
26 March 2014: Caesars announces Harrah's Tunica — the former Grand, the largest gaming floor between Las Vegas and Atlantic City — will close. Up to 1,300 layoffs. They had been trying to sell it for four years. Nobody wanted it.
2 June 2014: the doors shut. Roughly 1,000 jobs disappeared in a day. Casino employment, which peaked near 13,000 in 2001, was down to about 6,000. County tax revenue had already fallen from $47.3 million in 2006 to $28.3 million in 2013 — and kept falling.
Caesars filed Chapter 11 the following year with $19.9 billion in debt and got permission to dismantle and liquidate the five barges holding the Harrah's floor. The casino was demolished. What was left was 2,000 acres, three shuttered hotels, a dead convention centre, a silent golf course, and parking lots going back to weeds.
The site eventually sold for back taxes to TJM Properties, which discovered the county had been accepting special assessment payments outside state law under an informal verbal agreement — leaving the buyer with roughly $2.7 million in unpaid assessments and a title that only a Chancery Court order could clear.
In 2021 a developer announced a $140 million water park and sports complex for the site, with about $148 million in urban renewal bonds reportedly issued, and renderings on the news. Phase one was meant to break ground within months. By mid-2022 nothing had started. No further public reporting has appeared. The 2,000 acres are still empty.
FIVE CASINOS LEFT
Others closed in sequence: Tunica Roadhouse, Resorts Casino Tunica in June 2019 (Penn National citing Arkansas directly), Bally's, Treasure Bay, Isle of Capri.
Then the pandemic shut every casino in the county. When they reopened it was into a world of capacity limits, plexiglass and sports betting on a phone — a market that had already been cut into too many slices competing with an app on the couch.
September 2025: Boyd Gaming announced Sam's Town — one of the originals, Boyd's first casino outside Nevada, open since 1994 — would close permanently on 9 November 2025, citing market conditions.
Five remain: First Jackpot, Fitz Tunica, Gold Strike, Hollywood and Horseshoe. Down from ten at the peak.
THE NUMBER TODAY
Population about 9,500 — roughly where it started. Median household income about $38,000, roughly 30% below the state and 51% below the national median. Poverty between 31% and 34%, depending on the estimate.
That is far below the 56.8% of 1990, and that improvement is real. Sewer lines exist where open ditches ran. Roads exist where mud paths were. Schools are better funded. Families have better lives because the casinos came.
But: child poverty recently climbed to about 47% — worse than during the casino peak, worse than a decade ago. Nearly half the children in a county that received $882 million in gaming fees are growing up poor.
And in 2025, forty years after Jesse Jackson stood in the mud, Memphians marched to the site of the old Sugar Ditch to make sure people didn't forget.
SPLASH'S READ
The casinos didn't fail Tunica. The receipts show the county did — but that's only half of it, because the county was set up to fail by a structure that never required the money to reach the people.
Look at what the money bought: roads for casino traffic, an airport for casino visitors, a golf course for casino tourists. Every one of those is an investment in the customer, not the resident. Meanwhile the one line item aimed at residents — education — was 14%, and the county sued to stop paying even that.
And the 1997 tax cut is the whole tragedy in one decision. They cancelled the tax base during the boom, so when the boom ended they had nothing to fall back on — and the first thing they did was overtax the poorest people in the county by $5.5 million and then raid the road fund illegally to cover the hole.
This is the same lesson as the $5 billion mall and CoreWeave's one customer: a single revenue source is not an economy, it's a countdown.
The ditch is covered. The preacher is old. The gold tower still stands. And the money passed through.