βŒ•

EVERY PRODUCT TRUMP PUT HIS NAME ON β€” AND WHO ATE THE LOSS

NOV 10, 2026 Β· SPLASH Β· SOURCED FROM THE BACKSTORY Β· THE RECORD
Trump-branded products

THE TABLE. March 8, 2016, a golf club in Jupiter, Florida. A table stacked with steaks, wine, water and a magazine β€” set up to answer critics who said his businesses had failed. Five days earlier Mitt Romney had read the list aloud: Trump Airlines, Trump Vodka, Trump Steaks, Trump Mortgage, Trump University, Trump Magazine.

Reporters at the table found something better than a rebuttal. The steaks had stopped being sold around 2007-08; the packages carried the label of a local butcher, Bush Brothers of West Palm Beach. The magazine wasn't the newsstand title that folded in 2009 β€” it was a free publication for his clubs. The wine and water were real. The table was half true, and every item on it had his name.

THE MODEL. That's the whole story in one image: a name licensed onto products somebody else made, sold by somebody else, with the loss landing on somebody else's books.

Here's the structure, per court papers and reporting: a manufacturer designs and makes the product, a retailer stocks and sells it, the Trump Organization licenses the name and collects a royalty, usually a small percentage, plus approval rights over how the product and the name look. If it sells, the name shares the upside. If it dies, the partner carries the inventory, the marketing and the write-down. Then the name moves to the next box.

The contrast is set in 1989. That year he launched a Milton Bradley board game called Trump: The Game β€” and bought the Eastern Air Shuttle for about $365 million, renaming it Trump Shuttle, refitting the planes with maple veneer and, by several accounts, gold fixtures in the restrooms.

The game didn't sell; accounts describe stacks of unsold boxes. The airline lost money almost immediately β€” fuel prices rose in 1990, business travel fell β€” and by 1992 it belonged to his lenders, later folded into US Air, with the name off the planes. That's the lesson he apparently took: an owned product fails on the owner.

THE APPRENTICE EFFECT. For most of the 1990s the product business was small β€” Trump Ice bottled water, books including The Art of the Deal (written with ghostwriter Tony Schwartz). Then January 2004: NBC premiered The Apprentice, and the first-season finale drew about 28 million viewers. He even applied to trademark "You're fired."

Licensing a famous name can do in a day what years of advertising can't. What followed was a burst: a 2004 EstΓ©e Lauder men's fragrance; a suit and tie line that landed at Macy's, much of it made in China, Bangladesh and Mexico; the board game reissued; Trump University in 2005; Trump Vodka in 2006 through Drinks Americas, with a bottle designed by Milton Glaser β€” the man behind the I β™₯ NY logo; Trump Mortgage and the travel site GoTrump.com that same year; Trump Steaks through The Sharper Image in 2007; and a relaunched Trump Magazine.

Two details do a lot of work. The vodka: he has said repeatedly that he doesn't drink β€” his older brother Fred Jr. struggled with alcoholism and died in 1981 at 42. The man on the bottle never tasted the contents, and said so openly. It didn't matter; a licensed product needs the name on the label, not the man.

The mortgage company: launched April 2006, just as the subprime market was starting to crack. Its young chief executive's Wall Street experience was, per later reporting, very short. By summer 2007 it was shut. The name was paid; the partner and the borrowers weren't so lucky.

THE DURATIONS. Steaks: about two months at Sharper Image, which itself filed for bankruptcy in February 2008. Mortgage: about eighteen months. GoTrump.com: under a year. Vodka: the US version largely gone by around 2011. Magazine: folded 2009 when luxury advertising collapsed. Trump Network, an MLM vitamin business (formerly Ideal Health) that sold a home urine test called PrivaTest, was sold within a few years, with some sellers saying they'd spent more than they earned.

Then the biggest product of all, which wasn't a product.

THE SCHOOL. Trump University opened in 2005 and moved into hotel ballrooms. The funnel, per internal playbooks made public in court: a free introductory event, then a three-day seminar at about $1,495, then advanced packages β€” the top "Gold Elite" at about $34,995, promising a year of mentoring. The playbooks told staff to ask about students' credit limits and available cash. Some students said they were urged to raise their card limits to pay.

In a 2012 deposition he was asked about the "hand-picked" instructors in the ads. He said he hadn't selected them himself; he'd approved the program and trusted the people running it. And New York education officials had told the company back in 2005 that it couldn't call itself a university without a state charter. It kept the name until 2010, when it became the Trump Entrepreneur Initiative β€” by which point it had stopped taking students.

Tarla Makaeff, who had paid tens of thousands, became lead plaintiff in a California class action in 2010. The company countersued her for defamation; the countersuit failed and a court ordered his side to pay roughly $800,000 in her legal fees. In 2013 New York's attorney general, Eric Schneiderman, sued, seeking about $40 million in restitution.

THE EXITS. June 16, 2015: the escalator, the announcement. Within about two weeks NBC ended its relationship including the Miss Universe broadcasts; Univision dropped the pageant; on July 1 Macy's stopped selling the menswear after roughly a decade; Serta ended its license; PVH ended its shirt and tie deal; NASCAR moved its awards banquet; the PGA moved an event.

Notice what those were: suits, ties, mattresses, a pageant. Most were selling when they were dropped. These weren't market failures β€” they were partners deciding the name had become a liability to their own customers. For the first time, the name was the problem, not the product.

THE SETTLEMENT. November 2016, ten days after the election: Trump University settled the California class actions and the New York case for $25 million, no admission of wrongdoing. Many former students recovered most of what they paid β€” some reports put it near 90 percent for those who filed claims. That's a high recovery for a class action, and it took six years and a lawsuit to get.

There was also ACN, the MLM phone and energy company he spent about a decade promoting. His financial disclosures showed payments in the millions. A 2018 suit by former participants moved slowly; no final ruling against him has surfaced.

THE RETURN. The pattern from the board game held: a product fades, the name comes back on something new. December 2022: $99 digital trading cards, first batch of 45,000 sold out in about a day, with dinner offered to certain bundle buyers. February 2024: $399 gold high-tops unveiled at a sneaker convention the day after a New York judge ordered him to pay more than $350 million in a civil fraud case. March 2024: a $59.99 Bible with Lee Greenwood; shipping records reviewed by the AP showed copies printed in China. Watches from a few hundred dollars to six figures. Guitars.

January 2025: a memecoin whose paper market value briefly reached billions before falling sharply, with family-linked companies holding a large share of supply and top holders invited to a private dinner. June 2025: Trump Mobile, a $47.45-a-month plan and a gold phone called the T1, initially marketed as made in America β€” wording that later changed, with the delivery date slipping.

SPLASH'S READ: Thirty-five years, two completely different risk models, and the same name on the box.

In the licensing era, the genius wasn't the products β€” most were mediocre and several were dead in a year. The genius was the structure: he got paid on the royalty whether the thing sold or not, and the partner ate the inventory, the marketing and the reputational hit. That's why "he's bad at business" and "he made money" are both true. A failed product is not a failed deal for the licenser.

What changed after 2015 is who holds the risk. A steak needed Sharper Image to reach you; a coin, a phone or a Bible can be sold directly to people who are buying a statement as much as an object. The manufacturer still makes it, but the audience arrives already convinced. That moves the loss from a retailer's books to a supporter's wallet β€” and a supporter is much less likely to sue.

The one product that broke the model was the school, because it sold something the contract never promised: his methods, his hand-picked instructors, his judgment. Twenty-five million dollars and a decade of litigation later, the students got most of their money back β€” and he got a table of steaks on television.

MORE ON THE BOARD β–Έ
Every Casino Trump Put His Name On Β· Theranos Β· All Stories
Watch: The Backstory. Sources & claims: The Backstory (YouTube), "What Really Happened to Every Product Trump Put His Name On." Court records (the $25M Trump University settlement, the ~$800K fee award in the Makaeff matter, the 2012 deposition), the 2015 partner exits and the press-conference reporting are as presented in the video and consistent with contemporaneous coverage. Allegations in the ACN suit were never finally adjudicated against him. Current product prices and claims are as publicly marketed; the phone's final manufacturing location was unresolved in the reporting cited.