IN 2019 VANS WAS GROWING FASTER THAN NIKE. Sales up 26%, parent company at a record share price, a promise of a $5 billion brand by 2023. Seven years later Vans sells roughly half of what it sold at the peak, and VF's stock is about 80% below that record. The people running it saw the danger coming and said so out loud. Then they did it anyway.
WHY IS VANS COLLAPSING?
Because it sold the same five shoes to everyone on earth until they stopped meaning anything. Vans' growth in the late 2010s came almost entirely from the classics — Old Skool, Authentic, Era, SK8-Hi, Slip-On — which made up about two-thirds of its footwear business. When fashion moved to chunkier silhouettes and rivals like On, Hoka and the Adidas Samba, Vans had nothing new to answer with.
The numbers: Vans peaked at about $4.2 billion in fiscal 2022. It has fallen every year since — $3.7B, then $2.8B, then $2.35B — and finished fiscal 2026 down roughly another 11%, around half the peak.
THE PROMISE THEY MADE OUT LOUD
On 12 September 2018, VF took investors to Vans' headquarters in Costa Mesa and told them the plan: another $2 billion in revenue, $5 billion by fiscal 2023, with direct sales alone reaching $3 billion.
The global brand president, Doug Palladini, described the strategy in a phrase that turned out to be the whole story: Vans would grow by forsaking ubiquity. Bigger, by refusing to be everywhere. It would protect its roots in skateboarding, art and street culture instead of becoming another shoe you could grab off any rack in any mall.
VF had bought Vans in April 2004 for about $396 million — $20.55 a share — and compounded it at roughly 17% a year for fourteen years. That is a technology-company growth rate on a canvas shoe.
THE WARNING CAME FROM TEENAGERS, NOT ANALYSTS
Piper Sandler surveys American teenagers twice a year on their favourite brands. Fall 2019: Vans was the number two footwear brand among teens at 20%, behind Nike at 42% and ahead of Adidas at 9%. A skate brand from Anaheim was beating Adidas among American teenagers by more than two to one.
Spring 2020: 16%. Fall 2020: 12%. By fall 2023: 5th place, about 3%. In four years Vans lost roughly six out of every seven teenagers who had called it their favourite shoe.
The pandemic hid it for a year. Fiscal 2021 revenue fell 15% and VF blamed closed stores and shipping. Then reopening spending produced the biggest year in Vans' history — $4.2 billion in fiscal 2022 — which was the last year of real growth it would see.
“NEARLY ALL OF IT”
In March 2023 the man running Vans, Kevin Bailey, gave an interview to Footwear News that executives almost never give. He said the brand had become too comfortable, that it had lost its rebelliousness — “that FU attitude” — and that it had “got watered down.”
Asked how much of the slump the company had caused itself, he answered in three words: “Nearly all of it.”
THE COLLAPSE, QUARTER BY QUARTER
Winter 2022: sales fell 13% after a bad back-to-school season and wholesalers turned cautious. December 2022: CEO Steve Rendle resigned. February 2023: VF cut its dividend 41%, from 51 cents to 30 — ending a 49-year streak of increases, one year short of joining the dividend kings.
September 2023 quarter: Vans revenue fell from $950.8M to $748.8M — more than $200 million of sales gone in three months. VF pulled its forecast. October 2023: Bailey stepped down. By then an activist, Engaged Capital, was pushing for $300 million in cuts, and new CEO Bracken Darrell launched a programme called Reinvent to find exactly that.
The dividend was cut again that fall — 70%, to 9 cents. In nine months an income stock went from 51 cents a quarter to nine. Add an IRS loss on Timberland taxes ($875.7 million already paid), and a ransomware attack in December 2023 that exposed about 35.5 million customers.
SELLING THE FURNITURE
VF bought Supreme in 2020 for about $2.1 billion and sold it to EssilorLuxottica in July 2024 for $1.5 billion — roughly 30% less than it paid. Supreme had been a Vans collaborator since 1996, which is the joke nobody wrote: the little New York skate shop was sold to help pay for the mess at Vans.
In November 2025 VF completed the sale of Dickies for a base price of $600 million. It had bought the parent company in 2017 for about $820 million. Two acquisitions, two sales, both for less than cost.
WHAT IS ACTUALLY WORKING
The turn has not been nothing. Vans closed roughly 140 stores — about 20% of the network — walked away from discount channels, and handed the brand to Sun Choe, the product executive who had been chief product officer at Lululemon while its sales roughly quadrupled.
Under her: Authentic sales up 80% year over year in early 2026 on a campaign with SZA; a slim shoe called the Super Lo Pro restocked in 77 days, with one product cycle cut to under six months; buyer appointments at Paris Fashion Week up about 50% in June 2025. The holiday quarter of 2025 produced the first digital growth in four years.
The quarter ending 26 September 2026: Vans revenue $547.6 million, down 10% — roughly half the same quarter of 2022. Direct-to-consumer is growing again for the first time in almost five years. Wholesale is still shrinking.
THE 1984 PRECEDENT
Vans has been here before, and the first time was worse. After Fast Times at Ridgemont High put the checkerboard Slip-On on every kid in America in 1982, revenue roughly doubled from $20 million to $45 million. Vans then moved into a 175,000 sq ft factory, licensed its name onto sunglasses and notebooks, and chased sports it had no business in.
Knockoffs crushed prices, losses hit about $3.6 million over 21 months, total debt reached roughly $12 million, and in 1984 the bank called a $6.7 million note the company could not pay. Vans filed for Chapter 11 — two years after the biggest pop-culture moment in its history.
Paul Van Doren came back, cut the distractions, and by 1987 the company was profitable again on about $50 million in sales. The shoes were never the problem. Being everywhere was.
SPLASH'S READ
The most damning fact in this whole story is not the revenue line. It is that Vans' own leadership stood on a stage in 2018 and named the exact failure mode — grow by forsaking ubiquity — and then spent five years doing the opposite, because ubiquity is what the spreadsheet rewards.
Those are not contradictory impulses inside a company; they are the same impulse at two different distances. In a boardroom you want scarcity. In a wholesale meeting you want another 400 doors. The people who win the quarterly argument decide which brand you become.
And the tell was free the whole time. Every spring and fall, somebody asks American teenagers what shoe they like. Vans went 20%, 16%, 12%, 3% — a public countdown printed twice a year, years before the revenue line admitted anything. Nobody needed better data. They needed to believe it.