THE PROMISE. In 2008, Californians voted narrowly for Proposition 1A: a high-speed rail line connecting Los Angeles and San Francisco, trains at up to 220 mph, the trip in under three hours — faster than flying once you count security, and less than half the six-hour drive. The ads sold congestion relief, connection, clean air. The cost estimate was $33 billion.
Eighteen years later, more than $15 billion has been spent and the project still has no track in service. The latest figure for the original Los Angeles-to-San Francisco line is $126 billion, with a high estimate of $231 billion.
"That train is the worst cost overrun I've ever seen."
WHERE IT ACTUALLY STANDS. The state authority is building an initial segment between Merced and Bakersfield — 119 miles through the Central Valley — with an operational target of 2033. Sixty-six structures are complete, dozens more are under construction, and a 150-acre railhead facility opened in February to receive track materials. The first rails are supposed to go down this year.
That is real work, and the people building it are right that it's hard: this isn't a shared freight corridor, it's a system built from the ground up — guideways, viaducts, overcrossings. But the segment is also the thing critics warned about from the start.
"They certainly argued that they should not start in the Central Valley, that they should start on the ends, because that's where the people are."
That's Lou Thompson, who spent 15 years on the project's independent peer review group and 12 as its chairman, after a career as the World Bank's railway adviser and a role in Amtrak's early development. In March he wrote to state legislators saying the project had reached a dead end.
HOW THE HOLE OPENED. The Central Valley start wasn't a plan, it was a deadline. After the 2008 crash, the federal government pushed stimulus money out fast: the authority secured $2.5 billion from the Recovery Act and another $929 million in 2010 — money with spending clocks attached.
So construction began before the right of way was secured. The 119-mile segment alone required acquiring more than 2,200 land parcels. Negotiations with landowners turned into hundreds of eminent domain cases, straining rural courthouses and stalling work.
THE 80-BODY PROBLEM. The authority's own explanation for the delays is a number: coordination with 80 separate entities — five federal agencies, eight state departments, six cities, five counties, 31 utility owners, 22 quasi-governmental agencies and three freight railroads. Any one of them could cascade a delay.
"We have billions of dollars to build this project, and then they tie the authority's hands behind their backs."
The clearest example is a 400-foot section of guideway blocked by a dispute over an irrigation canal owned by a Central Valley utility. No jurisdiction over the utility, no power to move its pipes, and a legal fight that cost hundreds of thousands while contractors wait. And when contractors wait, they bill.
THE CHANGE ORDERS. The authority has spent more than $6.5 billion in change orders — money added to contracts when plans or timelines move. This year alone it agreed to pay one contractor up to $537 million in change orders.
THE CLIFF. The project's inspector general estimates that without new financing, the authority exhausts its current funding as soon as December 2027. A recent $4 billion federal clawback removed any cushion. Last year the legislature passed $1 billion a year through 2045 from the cap-and-invest program to fill the gap; the CEO is now seeking an advance on that money and says private investors are engaged and submitting proposals.
THE MOUNTAINS. The physical obstacle nobody can negotiate with: completing phase one requires tunneling through three major mountain ranges, and the peer review group says that underground work alone is nearly half the project's entire cost.
The authority's answer is an "optimized plan" — push the Merced and Bakersfield stations out of the city centers and single-track most of the route between them. The state's Legislative Analyst's Office says the authority failed to explicitly flag those scope changes in this year's draft business plan.
"You feel bad that it's costing so much, so you're changing things so it can cost less — but then you're not telling us that you're doing that."
THE CIGAR LOUNGE. Then there's the part that poisons public trust faster than any overrun. The inspector general identified $543,400 in travel expenses that weren't allowable under contract terms — first-class airfare, a cigar lounge, a nightclub. The board responded by curbing the CEO's power to unilaterally approve some contracts; the authority says controls are tightened and it will seek reimbursement.
WHAT CALIFORNIANS THINK. Nearly two-thirds still want the project to continue. More than half believe it's unlikely to be completed as envisioned. Both of those can be true at once, and they explain why it keeps getting funded: the alternative is admitting the state spent $15 billion to learn nothing.
SPLASH'S READ: This is the cleanest case in America of what happens when a project is funded by a deadline instead of a plan.
Every major failure traces back to sequence. Stimulus money arrived with a clock, so they started in the least expensive, least useful place — farmland — before they owned it, before utilities were relocated, before anyone had decided how to cross three mountain ranges. The cheap start became the expensive middle. And because the Central Valley segment doesn't connect two population centers, it can't generate the ridership or the political cover that would justify the next $100 billion.
The 80-entity problem is the other half. California's decentralization is a feature in most policy and a catastrophe in infrastructure: a state agency with billions of dollars and no authority over the irrigation district that owns the canal in its way. High-speed rail works in countries where the state can clear a corridor by decree. It has never been built anywhere by a body that has to ask 31 utilities for permission, one at a time, in court.
Which leaves the honest version of the question Thompson asks: not "can California afford $231 billion," but "can it afford to keep spending $1 billion a year to arrive at Merced with a train that goes to Bakersfield and stops."